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RESPONSE TO CROSS AND HASKER
David Burrell, C.S.C.

It is not often that one is graced with a mini-symposium upon reception of
an article for publication, and for this I am grateful to Bill Hasker, who had to
wait until after his editorship to respond to my provocative piece, and equally
grateful to Richard Cross, whom Bill solicited for an assist. Since my piece
called for a "radical transformation of standard philosophical strategies," and
Bill addressed that perspectival issue from the outset, while Richard focused
on some axial semantic and epistemological contentions, I shall begin with Bill
Hasker's overall puzzlements, proceed to address some issues on which Rich
ard Cross and I seem fated to disagree, and close by addressing the neuralgic
point of created freedom, which both Hasker and I find axial to attempting to
articulate the creator/creature relation. What gratifies me is the opportunity
to interact with such sterling critics, and to try to ascertain whether we can
advance a discussion (as Bill Hasker suggests) of issues which no sane human
inquirer can ever pretend to "get right."

Let me first articulate my sense of a common lacuna in the work of those
whom Bill Hasker identifies, for convenience, as "analytical theists." (I
am also "for convenience" labeled a "Thomist," even though many who
call themselves "Thomists" would foreswear my reading of Thomas
Aquinas.) I usually try to avoid doing philosophy by "isms," perhaps be
cause I find the "convenience" often creates stereotypes. As we shall see,
the "Thomist" label is too restrictive, for I shall argue (with my mentor,
Bernard Lonergan) that the Christian intellectual tradition was compelled
to incorporate metaphysical strategies from the outset, strategies to which
Aquinas often succeeded in giving succinct formulation, but which are
hardly to be identified parochially with him or with a school that adopted
his name. Moreover, a recent commentator on Aquinas, Rudi teVelde, cul
minates his lucid study with the provocative contention: "Aquinas is not a
theist," meaning to distinguish his approach to divinity from those whom
Hasker labels "analytical theists."1 So there is, or can be, a sharp conflict
here which "convenience" labels may dull or obscure.
So let me try to sharpen it by articulating the lacuna I find common in
the work of those whom Bill Hasker identifies, for convenience, as "ana
lytical theists." To make my original provocative remarks even sharper, let
me identify that lacuna as a virtual innocence of the history of Christian
thought, or at least an insouciance regarding the role which traditional
formulations have played in clarifying those strategies found to be neces
sary to articulate a revelation so challenging as that of God in the person
of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, rather than making the effort to incorporate
those clarifications which the tradition found to be essential, they prefer to
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adopt categories designed to make the work "analytic," when it may turn
out that these very categories have been introduced to avoid any reference
to a creator, as was the wont of modernity. It is precisely here that I am
indebted to Bernard Lonergan's insistence on Nicaea as axial to Christian
life and thought, a theme which Robert Sokolowski codifies with literary
conceit: "the distinction." For the overriding concern of Nicaea (intensi
fied in Chalcedon) is the shema: "Hear, O Israel, God our God is One!" The
fact that Jesus could not be "associated with God" led to incorporating
the extra-biblical formulation homoousion in the creed. (This explains why
I deliberately made reference to "the Islamic notion of shirk, the heresy of
'associating the creature with God,'" as a way of showing how Christian
ity had to confront the very difficulty to which Islam takes offence, in or
der to avoid introducing ridda ["innovation"] into the original revelation,
as some early [as well as recent] Christian thinkers in effect perpetrated in
attempting to formulate how Christians could worship Jesus.) This means
attending to the inherent dependence of Christian thought on strategies
formulated to secure its development, an approach which directly coun
ters the easy bifurcation between "philosophical" and "historical" which
Richard Cross employs in deflecting John O'Callaghan's trenchant critique
of his (rather standard) formulation of Aquinas's semantical epistemology
(as we shall se in part two).
Sokolowski proceeds in the opposite way with his "Christian distinc
tion," designed to summarize ways in which liturgical practice melded with
conciliar formulations to insist that the creator-God could not be one of the
things in the world. Yet as we shall see, there will be intrinsic limits to our
capacity to articulate the relation of creator to creatures, precisely because
the creator is not another thing in the world! And, pace Bill Hasker's sum
mary of Sokolowski's argument for the centrality of "the distinction," he
does go on to recommend Aquinas's identification of essence and esse ("act of
existing") as the best way to secure the original and originating "ontological
difference" of creator from creatures, much as Robert Adams endorses the
same ontological identification as the most succinct way of characterizing
God as "necessary being."2 This is a prime example of the way in which
Aquinas culminates the tradition before him, to secure it by transform
ing the metaphysical categories he had to work with. It is this witness of
Aquinas which makes me (and Sokolowski) recommend his strategies, as
a way of suggesting what we too must do with categories offered to us.
But one will utterly miss that signal witness if one is not attuned to axial
developments in the history of Christian thought, an insouciance which a
bifurcation between "philosophy" and "history" can easily license. As we
shall see in the following two parts of this response, certain ways of posing
the issues will depend radically on grasping "the distinction," which cannot
be clarified—as Bill wishes—without attending to the complex genealogy
of conciliar and theological formulations intended to secure the identity of
Christian thought—over against a generic "theism." Another way of putting
this is that sola scriptura has never worked, from the earliest centuries on.
Now to Richard Cross's more semantic discussion, much of which I have
to ponder to better grasp Scotus's strategies. Let me begin simply, by ac
knowledging that Aquinas has left us with a conundrum, dearly exhibited in
his treatment of "divine names," in which his agreement with Maimonides
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is greater than a surface reading of his criticism might suggest (ST 1.13). 3 He
culminates that discussion by insisting that we can indeed affirm something
of God by asserting the res signficata ("thing signified"), even though we must
clearly distinguish it from the modus significandi ("manner of signifying")
(ST 1.13.12). Now what is this res signficata? For Cross's "representationalist
Aquinas," it is the concept, for on a "representational" view, we must know
the concept in order to know the thing. Whereas if we are to follow Aquinas's
development in ST 1.13, letting ourselves be guided by John O'Callaghan's
treatment of these issues, the modus significandi is a far better candidate for
the concept.4 My clue here is his clear statement in ST 1.13.2 that "words like
'good' and 'wise' when used of God do signify something that God really
is, but they signify it imperfectly, because creatures represent God imper
fectly" (McCabe translation). Yet this is the conundrum, of course, for if we
must use an "imperfect concept" to state a perfection which outreaches any
concept we can have of it, how can we be said to assert something truly of
God? Or of anything, of course, so we have broached the $64 epistemologi
cal question raised by Plato in the Meno. So let us back up and try to find a
way around the conundrum.
The first step will jettison a "representational" approach, and let Aquinas
and O'Callaghan remind us that concepts are not objects per se, but that
by which something is known to be what it is. Some fit better than others,
which is what discussion is all about, and others will never quite fit, as
Socrates kept showing us. I like to distinguish between questions which
have an answer ("how far is it from South Bend to O'Hare?") from those
which require discussion, first to clarify and then to attempt an illuminat
ing initial response, like "should the US get out of Iraq?" And I would put
all ethical questions in the second group, as signaled by "should." Aquinas
identifies a privileged subset of terms alone able to be used of God, which
he calls "perfection terms," which I would extend to all evaluative terms.
They are all susceptible of that inner differentiation which Socrates finds in
"wise," where the proper grammar for "wise" is that "wise persons know
they are not wise." Without this inner "play," ethics becomes conventional
morality, which of course is not morality at all! This is how "analogous
terms" operate: without any theory we develop ways of negotiating their
proper use. It's like learning how to take corners on a bicycle; there are
formulae, but even if we knew them we would not have time to calculate
the answer before taking the corner! (Polanyi). Indeed, this is "commonsensical," for "ordinary people" can be very good at such things; "wise,"
we might say, yet we can readily distinguish between someone adept and
someone "wooden." Aristotle (and the GRE's) remind us that intelligence
is displayed in an adept use of metaphor, which might suggest why I find
univocity procrustean in domains other than the divine as well.
How do we gain such adeptness? There is only one answer: through
practice; but it must also be acknowledged that some never do! That sug
gests that we are in the realm of judgment here, for judgment gives some
the ability to direct an inadequate concept to its target, whereas others will
simply allow it to mislead them. Yet with such practices we are entering
that way of doing philosophy which Pierre Hadot identifies with "ancient
philosophy"; something which modernity, preoccupied with finding ad
equate concepts, has simply overlooked.5 Yet if we ask ourselves why we
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find some writing on tangled, ethical issues better than others, it will indeed
have to do with clarity but with much more as well: like nuance, a feeling
for context, judicious weighing of alternatives. Has philosophy no room
for this, when human considerations demand it? In short, Richard, I agree
that one can construct highly abstract concepts that could pass muster as
"univocal"; I just don't think you can do much, if anything, with them. For
example, Scotus's assertions that "every philosopher was certain that that
which he posited to be the first principle was a being," supplemented by
"there are some concepts—here, b ein g -u n d er whose extension both God
and creatures fall," both fail the test question: "how many things are there
in the room?" We cannot obtain a generic "animal" at the shelter for ani
mals nor can we pick out things as things: "being" cannot function as a sortal term. (Astute readers will hear echoes of Aristotle and of Wittgenstein
throughout: here it is the need for "grit"; earlier, the need sometimes for
"agreement in judgments.") And again, what happens when we find our
selves agreeing in judgments with an interlocutor? I suspect that we have
negotiated a sinuous path together, made adjustments for the disparity of
contexts from which we individually came, and found some illumination
together; in short, we are "able to go on" (Wittgenstein). And if arguments
touching on real situations will inevitably require adjustment for context,
then the working notions cannot be univocal. But could "adjustment" here
mean finding a univocal intersection between the disparate senses of the
original notions? Sometimes it might; at other times it might mean that
both interlocutors must step into a richer context.
The latter is Aquinas's strategy when he asks whether there can be any
"likeness" between creatures and the creator. The answer, predictably, is
YES and NO: precisely as sharing in existence creatures can resemble their
creator (ST 1.4.3). But since existing is not a feature of things, and we nor
mally trace resemblance to features held in common, then whatever links
them cannot be identified. This is perfectly in character with Aquinas's
metaphysics, since what makes discourse about divinity possible at all is
the act of creation, itself a gift, which "the distinction" uniquely illumi
nates. Moreover, Wittgenstein will also remind us that we often cannot
say by what feature we identified our friends, though we have no trouble
identifying them. So it is difficult to escape the conclusion that reasoning
in tangled human affairs will involve judgments modifying the senses of
the terms each party is using, while the terms themselves must be inher
ently analogous to be susceptible to such modification, which, once made,
allows us to "reason together." Now since we are doing this all the time,
and some are better at it than others, the capacity to do so must be more
"commonsensical" than "theoretical," yet no less admirable for that.
Now to human freed om -lots of big issues here! I am sure, Bill, that
"libertarian" views are multiple, so let me try to state what I find repre
hensible in all of them with which I am acquainted, largely through their
use.6It is that free actions find their origin in the subject alone, so are more
akin to initiating than to responding, which I take to be part of what mod
erns cherish in "autonomy." Such a view finds its issue in "will power,"
which I find to be either useless or self-defeating, as I shall show from
your example. Acknowledging the role played by desire, which picks up
my focus on the role of "the good," you then insist:
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[But]
urselves who determine, within the situation, what it is we
most desire. We do have some control, though not unlimited control,
over the relative strengths of our various desires; one way we do this
is by voluntarily directing our attention in this way rather than that.
We [a] reinforce our perseverance in a difficult task by dwelling upon
the goods to be realized by its accomplishment, and we [b] steel our
selves against temptation by deliberately banishing from our minds
the thought of the pleasure that would result from a course of action
we have recognized as being wrong or otherwise defective. (And of
course, we may attempt to do either of these things, and fail in the
attempt; that is an important ingredient in "weakness of will.")
I have been suggesting, however, that these are two quite different actions
rather than simply being two ways we can act (in the sense of " ourselves
. . . determine" what is to be done): (a) involves letting ourselves be lured
by the good in question; while (b) requires that we push an apparent good
away; so (b) is an example of "will-power," while (a) involves letting the
lure of the good prevail. But it takes scant psychological insight to find that
"steel[ing] ourselves against temptation by deliberately banishing from
our minds the thought of the pleasure that would result from a course of
action we have recognized as being wrong" is largely counterproductive;
indeed, can easily serve to elicit just the wrong sorts of fantasies! In such
matters, is it not more plausible to treat ourselves as we are instructed to
assist children: instead of forbidding one thing, offer another in its place?
That would confirm a responsive view of freedom while minimizing any
pretense of control. If my view of willing cannot be something undertaken
"on its own," as it were, but always involves an appreciation as well as
multiple discriminations regarding the salient good in question, that does
indeed argue for an intellectual dimension inherent to willing, closer to
Aristotle and to Aquinas than to Scotus, at least as I have been able to un
derstand him. That is what I mean by "responsive." As between these two
views, one can only ask which one is closer to our ongoing experience. Part
of my annoyance with the phrase "libertarian freedom" is that too many
philosophers think it is simply an intensive way saying "free," whereas I
want to tease out the theory imbedded in "libertarian" discourse, because
I think it is a wrong one, for the reasons adduced here.
Now to the divine-human interaction, for genuine disagreement of a
metaphysical sort, rather than phenomenological alternatives, will emerge
here. I am construed as saying:
His most trenchant criticism is that the libertarian view removes free
creatures from the activity o f the creator, thus in effect "denying the uni
versal scope of creation." This, he says, is an "essentially Mu'tazalite"
view, referring to an early school of Islamic thought that was dis
credited in consequence of the relentless determinism embraced by
Sunni Islam.
Let me expound a bit the Mu'tazalite view, for once I understood it, I was
astounded to see it played out so clearly in the now-standard "free will
defense" of human freedom in the face of a creator. The premise implicit in
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Mu'tazalite teaching was that any genuine action had to be a creating; that
is, an ex nihilo origination on the part of the subject in question. If that be the
case, then free agents had to be the creators of their free actions, so to avoid
any competition with the creator Mu'tazalites contended that God created
everything except human actions. (Think here of standard formulations of
the "free will defense," designed to distance a creator from the process.) This
proved to be too much for Islamic thought and practice, since it removed an
incredible amount of creation from the creator's purview. So another school
of theology, the Ash'arites, won out, which I have shown (in Freedom and
Creation in Three Traditions) hardly promoted the stereotypical "relentless
determinism embraced by Sunni Islam." But to have exposed the implicit
Mu'tazalite premise will help us to counter Bill's charge that determinism is
the inevitable result of involving the creator in human freedom.
Indeed, the very point of Sokolowski's "distinction" and of Kathryn
Tanner's "non-contrastive agency" is to remove the inevitability of a
"zero-sum game" between creator and creatures, which Hasker simply
presumes to be the case. In other words—and this is the entire thrust of
my provocative essay—he does not wince at treating the relation between
creature and creator as parallel with that between two creatures:
the doctrine of creation, as interpreted by Burrell, entails that human
actions are "created by God" in the sense that God, and God alone,
determines which actions shall be performed. But once we see this clearly,
it is evident that the doctrine of creation has been highjacked, stolen
away and given a new meaning that is in no way implied in the
original intention of the doctrine.
Note how quickly he presumes that to create is to determine. Parsing a state
ment of Kathryn Tanner (whose details I need not sign onto), he says:
This is as clear a statement of theological determinism as anyone
could wish for, in spite of the fact that both Tanner and Burrell dis
like the word "determinism." (Objecting to one's opponent's choice
of terminology can sometimes seem to be a rather transparent strat
egy for avoiding discussion of a topic one dislikes.) The idea is that
since God is creator, and thus on a "different level" from the human
agent, the fact that it is ultimately God who decides what the hu
man being shall do in no way detracts from her freedom "on the
creaturely level."
Bill defines "theological determinism" as "determinism in which the rel
evant conditions have to do with the will and decrees of God." But why
can't one rather follow the lead which he notes that I have given, and which
is certainly part of "the original intention of the doctrine [of creation]," to
wit: that creator and creatures are on decidedly "different levels," and if
so, one cannot blithely conclude that "it is ultimately God who decides
what the human being shall do," for that image suggests two deciders
competing. The reason we (Kathryn Tanner and I) do not like to describe
creation as "determining" is precisely because "determine" presumes a
flat field of competing forces, but a God who would be the "ultimate" force

RESPONSE TO CROSS AND HASKER

211

in a flat field of like forces, differing only in power, would be the "biggest
thing around"; not the creator. Can I be blamed for being baffled that phi
losophers ostensibly writing in the Christian tradition spend so little time
or effort to distinguish the activity of the creator from that of creatures?
Bill Hasker's constructive reference to my argument proceeds in
this way:
Furthermore, in sustaining her God sustains her causal powers, in
cluding the power to make choices such as the one that now lies
before her. When she does choose, God adds his "concurrence" to
her decision, enabling it to be carried out; [observing at this point
in a note]: actually the need for a distinct divine act of concurrence
is controversial; I include it here in order to present Burrell with the
richest possible theistic account of libertarian choice.
Can anyone conceive how "God could add x to anything?" If this form of
discourse is not idolatrous, what is? Indeed, the entire notion of concursus,
like that of "determine," presumes two modes of causality parallel to each
other. Intending to serve me with a "richest possible theistic account," Bill
has undermined any way of acting proper to a creator.
If my arguments are too "contextual," Barry Miller offers a properly
austere account of "the relation between divine and creaturely causation,"
suggesting that we employ the "opaque context" device: "God makes it
to be the case that (I decide this way)," to manifest that the two causations
are on different levels, and to suggest that the creaturely is dependent
on the divine but not in a straightforward way, thus defusing charges of
"determinism."7 Whether this "works" or not, it at least makes a stab at
presenting the ineffable creator/creature relation whereby, Aquinas insists,
God can make it to be the case that creatures act freely.
How can we articulate what is going on here? By insisting that the rela
tion between creator and creature must be sui generis to preserve the integ
rity of each, I am accused of not being clear enough, yet the only way to be
clear, it seems, would be to treat the relationship as one within the world
of creatures! But it has been my contention in this, and an earlier piece,
that the "ideas that are typical of the analytic mainstream in philosophy of
religion" are proposed in innocence of the history of Christian thought, in
such a way that dispenses them from attending to that rich tradition. But
how then can they claim then to be doing "Christian philosophy of reli
gion?" Let me propose a suspicion of an answer, prompted by celebrating
the feast of Pentecost at Abu Ghosh, a Benedictine abbey in the Holy Land.
Rich in male and female voices, in the tones of oud and flute, incense and
prostrations, this extended prayer addressed to God did not pretend to be
conceptually adequate—else these things would be mere accoutrements,
better dispensed with. But is not that what some strands of the Reforma
tion actually tried to do, precisely by dispensing with symbol and gesture,
music and allusion? So I asked myself: what if my form of worship were
relentlessly verbal, word deprived of sacrament? Might that not lead me
to presume the expressions uttered to be conceptually adequacy?
Would I not then presume, with Richard Cross, that when Aquinas
spoke of the "meaning of a word predicated of 'God' and of 'creatures' as
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one res significata (Summa theologiae I, q. 13, a. 3)," that he was speaking of
"one concept, representing one perfection," whereas what he actually says
(as we have seen) is that "words like 'good' and 'wise' when used of God
do signify something that God really is, but they signify it imperfectly
because creatures represent God imperfectly." Recall how the "represen
tational" view makes it unthinkable to limit the use of "concept" to the
modus significandi, since what these words signify must be a concept, for all
knowing (and utterance) is grounded in representation. Yet if we privilege
speaking to God over speaking about God, and if our characteristic way of
speaking to God is mediated by symbol, gesture, and music, then it would
seem equally natural to acknowledge that whatever linguistic vehicles we
have will be inadequate in the face of the divine reality, but so what? For
me, a rich liturgical context outweighs "the analytic mainstream in phi
losophy of religion," especially as it becomes clear that the "clarity" which
that party values will be bought at the price of denying the transcendence
proper to a creator, the very "distinction" that Sokolowski finds omni
present in early Christian thought and practice. So rapprochement there
not seem to be, but others may profit from seeing differences sharpened,
and from a richer variety of references than is customary in "the analytic
mainstream in philosophy of religion," and for this I must thank my inter
locutors, for criticism is highest praise in doing philosophy.
University of Notre Dame / Tantur Ecumenical Institute, Jerusalem
(21 June 2007)
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